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Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and R eason
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P.

MAHER

Assu111p1io11 Colle)!e
Wi>rcesrer, Massacltuselts

T H E MOST widely noted aspect of Pope Benedict's speech at the
University of Regensburg in September of 2006 has been his quotation
of a brief passage from an otherwise obscure text chat, with "startling
brusqueness," speaks ill of Islam. I The Holy Father stated that he found
chis brusqueness "unacceptable," but, evidently, not so unacceptable as to
preclude his quoting it. H is willingness to use the text has been judged
still more unacceptable by large numbers of M uslims and non-Muslims
alike. And this reaction in its various forms has diverted attention from
and nearly ovenvhelmed the central message of the speech. That message
focuses on the adequacy of human reason for coming co know God.
According to Benedict's text, the quotation that has received so much
attention serves merely as a starting-point for his reflections on the relation of faith and reason. He begins with Islam as one foil against which
he presents the harmony of faith and reason. The second and main foil is
not Islam, but what he calls "modern reason," "positivistic reason," or
reason under a self-imposed limitation. Against a faith that denies God's
reasonableness and against a rationality that denies faith's reasonableness,
Benedict arriculates the harmony of faith and reason. 2 The present essay
1

Pope Benedict XVI, "F:iich, Reason and the Uruversity: Memories and Reflections" (University of Regensburg. 12 Sepcember 2006), 'V3. The translation is
taken front www.vatican.va and will be cited parenthetically in the text as
"Faich" along with the paragraph number.The German text is available from the
same source and retalru the same paragraph divmoru.
2 James Schall emphasizes the significa nce of Benedict's speech for reinvigorating
the proper understanding of the uruversity as the proper place for the cultivation
of this harmony. See bis TI1e Re,11ensb11rg Lect11fl' (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's
Press, 2007). especially 18- 40.
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examines Benedict's argument for chis harmony and then rurns co the
encyclical Deus Caritas Est for illustrative examples of v,trious kinds of
harmonious co-operation between faith and reason.3

Introductory Remarks
le is helpful to begin with an initial sketch of a few clisunctions that an:
operative in Benedict's speech. The title, "Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections," announces the main theme of faith and
reason. Beneclict uses each of these terms in multiple senses. The most
prominent senses of "faith" distinguished in the speech are Christianity
and Islam. In addition to these opposed forms of faith, of course, there
also are opposed forms of Christianity. Similarly, "reason" has multiple,
opposed meanings in the speech. One form of reason is modern scientific reason and another form is philosophical reason. Again, philosophical reason, too, appears in multiple and opposed forms. When Benedict
goes on to speak of harmony between fa ith and reason, not all forms of
reason are equally harmonious with all forms of faith. Indeed, it seems
that one of the goals of the speech is to show that, despite the distinction
between faith and reason, Christian faith and philosophical reason rmy
have more or more important things irt common with one another than
either has with Islam or wich modern rationalism. Benedict's portrayal of
possible harmony between faith and reason makes intelligible the activity of theology, understood as rational inquiry that begins with the
acceptance of the deposit of faith. 4
In addition co developed or sophisticated rational activities like theology, philosophy, and science, Oenedict also draws our attention to the
ordinary human rationality that is presupposed by each of them. We must
recognize that human rationality docs not o riginate in the form of
science or philosophy. Ordinary experience and the effort to understand
the world precede the appearance of philosophy, which comes on the
scene as part of the human effort to remedy and correct the fallibility and
error ingredient co ordinary opinion. Philosophy is originally the attempt
to perfect our rationality, which we first exercise in ordinary experience.
' E1uyclim/ Lerter Deus Cunas Est .iftlrt' S11prt'1111· P.1111iff Bmt'din X VJ ''' 1/1e Bis/11>p.<,
Priest.<, aud Dc<1ce111s, Ml'll <111d WiJ111e11 Rel1;11io11s, m11/ All tire l.Ay F.ti1/ifr1/, 011 C/1m1i1111 L.w<• (25 December 2005).The translation is taken from www.vatican.va and
will be cited parentheucaUy Ill the 1ex1 as DCE ;Uong with che secnon number.
4 Benedict speaks of theologian~ "inquiring about che reasonableness of faith"
("Faith," 1) <ind. usmg almost che s.ime formulauon. he refers to theology
"precisely as theology. as inquiry into the rauonaltry of fmh" (a/.( e~~111/icl1e
TI1ct>ltl)!ir, al< Fr.we 1w/1 der ~·r11111ift 1/es G/1111/1e11s) (ibid., ~ 15). He Jlso says,
"theologtJns seek co correlate !faith] w1ch reason as a whole" (ibid.. I).
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Whereas modern science tends to depreciate the epistemic significance
of the ordinary grasp of the world and to prefer the results of science as
the decisive or final truth, Benedict wants to appeal to our common
rationality that precedes science and to defend philosophy and theology
as belonging to "the right use of reason" ("Faith," ifl). Our common
rationality needs his support because human confidence in ordinary
rationality comes under tremendous pressure both from some theological views (Christian and non-Christian in origin) and from some scientific views. In this speech Benedict emphasizes the way in which Islam
can be used to stress divine transcendence to such a degree that all trust
in human reason is voided. Also, he emphasizes the way in which the
power of modem science, as the authoritative form of human knowing,
leads us to dismiss as false or unreliable our ordinary grasp of the world.
According to the positivistic view of reason Benedict criticizes, the sorts
of questions that animate philosophy and theology-because they cannot
be addressed in scientific ways-must be set aside as meaningless or nonrarional. Benedict aims to separate faith and theology from the irrationalism of some forms of Islam and to separate reason ,md philosophy
from the truncated form of modern scientific rationalism. This opens the
door to the harmony of faith and reason.
The preceding sketch provides some indication of the analysis of
Benedict's argument that follows below. The first two sections of this
essay deal with the two pares of the Regensburg speech. The first pare of
Benedict's speech is especially devoted to articulating the rationality or
reasonableness of God and God's actions in contrast to claims that God's
ways are so far beyond human reason as to be unintelligible to us. And
the first section of this essay explains how Benedict presents the accessibility of God to human reason. The second part of Benedict's speech
analyzes the effort to dehellenize Christianity as an attempt to replace the
Greek conception of rationality with the modern scientific conception.
The second section of this essay explains Benedict's argument that reason
must extend more broadly than the modern scientific form of reason, at
least insofar as we must recognize the rational legitimacy of philosophy
and theology. The two parts of I3enedict's speech together can be understood to create the space for the harmony of faith and reason because in
them Benedict shows how the recovery of a broadened understanding of
reason makes it possible for us to recognize the intelligibility of God. The
third section of this essay turns to Deus Caritas Est in order to show how
Benedict has displayed there three distinct modes of the harmonious cooperation of reason and faith.
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Reason and God
T he pope began his speech Jt R egensburg by telling a joke about atheism.
M ore precisely, Pope Benedict repeated a former colleague's gibe chat
pokes fun at professors and at believers. Believers amuse because they .1re
sometimes naive and professors amuse because they are sometimes, at least
from the point of view of common sense, senseless in their pursuit of
rationality. This ~Ort ofjoke has such a long pedigree that 1t deserves to be
considered with some seriousness.5 The originator of Pope Benedict's joke
made professors who are believers the target of his ridicule: "a colleague
had said there was something odd ,1bout our university: it had two facuJties devoted to something th,H did not exist: God" ("Faith," 4).The surface
of the joke ribs the academics and their penchanr for pointless investigations and tedious repetition. T he heart of the joke is the declaration of
atheism. The heart of the joke divides people inro those who " know" there
is no God and those who, nevertheless, continue to investigate or seek or
speak about him. The charac:ter of the "knowing" here is not specialized,
academic, insider's knowledge, as if this were a joke that onJy economists
or physicists could find fimny. T he knowing mentioned is ordinary, everyday knowledge, and the joke is about the persistence of what might be
called superstition.6 The charge of persistent superstition is softened and
made friendJy by its being covered over with an image of academic
buffoonery. as if theism were nothing more than a charming eccentricity.

Seriously rauonaJ men have been entermning Thracian maids and ochers at le.1st
since Thales. See Plato, 171r11etetm 174a- b. Diogenes uertius records a slightly
dllferem version (L.m~ of the Em mew Pl1ilt•5<1p/1m I, tr.nu. R. D. H1ck.s (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harv.i rd University Press, 1972), 34). For a modern appret-iation, see
Martin Heidegger, IH1a1 '-' "771i1\e? trans. W B B.inon .ind Vera Deuuch (South
Bend, Ind.: Regnery/Gateway, 1967), 2-4. Heidegger dr.1ws attention to
Socrates·s claim in Plato's version: "T hlS jest also fits all those who become
mvolved in philosophy." Socrates hunself has alw.iys been assoc1.ited with .iw.ireness of the condinons presupposed by his own .ictivity. For a modern im.igc of
senseless rationality 111 its scientific form, ~ee Fnednch N1eruche, "The Leech:· in
77111s Spoke Z.1mthmfr<1, tr.im. Walter Kaufi11.um (New York: Pen gum Books, 1954),
248-51. Th1s version could easily be turned agamst Benedict's former colle.igue.
(,See " Faith," ~ 1 2. where Benedict JssertS that the modern concept of reason and
the standard 1111posed by modern scienufic method causes the question of God
to appe.ir "unsc1cnufic or pre-sc1cnufic." F.11th appears to be 1denucal with credulousness. that is, naive. uneducated opinion. For a contempor.iry articulation of
the d1stmct1011 between thcologic.i.I faith and ordm.iry op1ruon. see Robert
Sokolowski, "Philosophy and the Chriman Act of Faith," in C/1ri.<t1a11 Faith 1111d
H111111111 1.: 111frNa111/11\I/ (W.ishmgcon. DC : Catholic University of America Press.
2005), 25-37.
5
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13ecause this simple joke arises from and reflects the modern form of
reason Benedict wants to discuss, it serves to introduce the central theme
of the speech. The joke characterizes Christian faith as superstition and
atheism as comparatively respectable. To some extent, the plausibility of
these views 1s itself an expression of the popular influence of the successful part of the modern form of reason: modern natural science. The prominence of science in contemporary life exerts tremendous influence as the
authoritative form of knowing. What 1s not known or not yet known
according to scientific methods or procedures is ordinarily regarded as not
genuinely known, but only believed. To cling with faith to what 1s nor
scientifically known or not scicnotically knowable is, in the presence of
science as the standard of knowledge, hard to distinguish from superstition
or what Pope Benedict calls "the realm of the subjective" ("Faith," ~13).
Common sense 1tself has become mformed by science. More precisely, it
has become informed by a popular and somewhat superfici.11 appreciation
of the power of science. Especially (but not exclusively) through the pervasiveness of technology m our lives, modern scientific reason dommates our
world and comes to shape our thinking to the point that awareness of
sophisticated, rationalist atheism becomes a component of common opinion. Even if we do not hold atheistic opinions, we remain aware of the
modern tendency to regard Christianity as unscientific and as belonging to
the past. These matten. arc so thoroughly a part of our thinking that when
a pope repeats a German professor's fifty-year-old joke, without explanation, everybody gets it. We arc aw·arc that we live peaceably, side-by-side
with atheists, many of whom base their atheism on modern science (or
claim to do so). The Chrisoao and the atheist agree on the reliability of the
science that enables them both to conceive of the earth as a planet orbiting the sun and to travel by airplane or communicate by telephone. 7
Science unites us, even if our moral and religious beliefS, which we arc
accustomed to regard as personal or private, remain fundamentally
opposed.!! Our reliance on technology is only the most obvious way in
which modernity shapes our common life. People who consider themselves un-modern or even anti-modern often do not realize the extent to
7 Cf. Deu5 C11ri1115 £<1, §30a: "Today the means of mass commumcacion have nude
our planet smaller." It 1s noc insignificant when a pope uses an astronomical term
to designate the earth.
K It 1s not quite true co say chis of some mamfesunons of Islam, which do seem to
want co reject modern science and its mampulJtion of nature. But H does rcmam
true that the contemporary Islamic opponents of the West acknowledge chat
chert' is no effective subscituce for Western technology when they learn how co
use .rnd become relidnt upon, for example, a1rplanl-s, tht> lntt>rnet, and plastic
explos1vt>s detonated by ct>U phones.
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which modernity, especially through common opinion, has shaped them
before they have begun to reject it. The unreflective way in which very
many people resort to modern understandings of rights or culture or
history are simple manifestations of chis. It goes without saying that ideas
are not bad or false because they are modern any more than they are true
or good because they are old. T he point is chat these ideas dominate our
common discourse and thus tend to shape our thinking without our
awareness. For all of us, taking critical distance from modernity in order to
understand it is a matter of learning and of un-learning habits of mind. ln
a sense, then, the rationalist professor's joke is on all of us who get it. We
are the ones who are under the sway, more or less, of the modern form of
reason and we are more or less aware of that fact.
To return, now, from these matters to the H oly Father's use of this
joke, we note that he seems to have taken no offense from it. H e does not
respond with a joke of his own at the expense of atheists.9 Instead, he
appropriates the joke to make an observation about the role of reason for
believer and unbeliever alike: despite the serious and fundamental division between atheism and faith and despite the ridicule contained in the
joke, the "profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was
not troubled" ("Faith," ~1 ). 10 Precisely because believers and unbelievers
can share laughter about the silly manner in which some pursue rationality we see that reason itself unites the believers and the atheists. Indeed,
reason makes them the same. Reason is what they share and the medium
in which they communicate with and understand one another, despite
their profound differences. The sense of reason at issue here is more
fundamental than the highly specialized form of scientific reason. One of
the main goals of Benedict's speech is to recover some respect for this
One could say that Benedict gently nirns the lesson of che joke against people
like ics author. If the point of the joke is chat those who exercise reason must not
forget the condition of the possibility of the exercise of reason (lest they fall in
a well, as it were), Benedict's concluding remarks issue the same cautionary
warning without che mockery: "The West has long been endangered by chis
aversion tO the questions which underlie its rationalicy, and can only suffer great
harm thereby" ("Faith," 116). Virgil Nemoianu notes the same pastoral gentleness in Cardinal Ratzinger's exchange with Habermas. Cf. Nemoianu. "The
Church and the Secular Establishment," ~os 9 (Spring 2006): 36-38.
in Pope Benedicc interprets the joke generously and, since he was there and he
knows the original speaker of chese words, one must concede to him that no
serious attack on the theology fuculties lies within the joke. Nevertheless, in light
of what the Holy Father goes on to say about che second scage of dchellenization ("Faith," ~11-13 and ~15-16), one must also recognize that some serious
members of the "universe of reason" may in fact look forward to the withermg
away of cheology from the universicy.
9
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more basic sense of reason. Human beings are rational not only when we
are scientific; we arc rational also in the pre-scientific and ordinary use of
reason. The H oly Father needs to appeal to this more fundamental level
in order to indicate the path co overcoming the division between an
Islamic extremist, a Christian believer, and a rationalist atheist. I I Reasonableness makes all of us the same as one another. Moreover, as he argues
in the first half of the ~peech, reasonableness makes us one with God.
Benedict's argument requires the recovery of ordinary rationality and of
the rational grasp of God.
The joke's role in this argument is ambiguous. As originally delivered,
the joke appeals to common sense as informed by the specialized rationality of modern science. It both relies upon ordinary reason and exhibits
the scientific depreciation of ordinary reason. As appropriated by the
Holy Father, the joke serves a different purpose. Whereas the professor
meant to disparage ordinary reason, the pope means to rehabilitate it as
part of an attempt to rehabilitate the rationality of other non-scientific
forms of reason, namely, philosophy and theology.12 The first half of the
speech is especially devoted to articulating the coherence of faith and
philosophical rationality; the second half of the speech is especially
devoted to showing that even modern science requires a philosophical
form of reason. All of this 1s folded into the joke. Because of the way the
joke implies the incompatibility of faith and reason, it serves to introduce
each of the central ideas of the whole speech. We must admire the
complexity Benedict has incorporated into such a simple joke.
Let us return once more to the speech itself and see how Benedict
enters into the topic treated in the first half. H e mentions this joke in the
process of recollecung certain aspects of his days at the University of
Bonn. It is not the experience of being at Regensburg and of being once
again in the uruversity atmosphere that calls up these recollections. The
joke is not merely an amusing anecdote, marginally related to the central
In his reply co this speech- "Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt iiber Glauben
und Wissen und den Defoitismus der modernen Vernunft," Ne11e Z11rd1er Zei"1t111.J!,
10 February 2007- Jiirgen Habermas. disagrees with Benedict regardmg what
constitutes "conunon reason," but he agrees chat that is che focal point: "Fides
quaerens incelleccum-so bcgriissenswerc die Suche nach der Verniinfcigkeic des
Glaubcns isc, so wenig hilfreich scl1einc es mir iu sein, jene drei Enchellenisierungsschiibe, die zum modernen Sclbstverscindnis der sakularen Vcrnunfc
be1gecragen haben, aus der Genealogie der 'gemeinsamen Vemunft' von Gliiub1gen. Unglaub1gen und Andersglaubigen auszublenden."
12 See, for example, Benedict. "Faith," iflS: "The intention here 1s not one of
retrenchment or ne~uve cmic1sm, but of broadening our concept of reason and
its applicauon •·

11
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theme of the speech. Instead, he says, the recollections (including the
joke) are called to mind by his reading of Professor Theodore Khoury's
edition of a fourteenth-century dialogue, between a Byzantine emperor
and an educated Persian, treating, among other matters, the relation
between three laws (corresponding to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).
The pope selects one point from the dialogue to begin his reflections on
faith and reason: "(H]ere l would like to discuss only one point-which,
in the context of the issue of'faith and reason', I found interesting and
which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue"
("Faith," ~2). The reflections concern the issue of faith and reason. The
reflections take as their starting-point a remark by the emperor about the
attempt to spread faith through violence. "Not acting reasonably (cruv
A.6yc.p is contrary to God's nature.... Whoever would lead someone to
faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without
violence and threats.... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need
a strong arm, or weapons of any kind." 13
As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that, despite their
being made in the context of the use of violence by members of a particular religious tradition, these claims are non-sectarian. Any religious
attempt to use violence would serve the essential purpose here.14 lt
should also be noted that the joke is equally non-sectarian. The joke
could be made in the context of any theology faculty. T he form of
reasoning that ends in the joke begins with the dismissal of all faith as
superstition. At this point, these considerJtions make it seem that the joke
and the emperor's remarks contribute more or less equally to the identification of the theme of Benedict's reflections. Whereas the joke presents
a modern form of tension between faith and reason, the emperor's words
evoke the problem in a different way, which precedes modernity and yet
remains with us today. Against the conception of God as utterly transcendent and unintelligible in his power, the Holy Father affirms the
"profound harmony" (" Faith," ~5) of the God of faith with human
reason. At the same time, the Holy Father affirms the legitimacy of
inquiry into God as a proper exercise of human reason, over against those
The words quoted are those of the emperor. They appear in paragraph 3 of
Benedict's speech. Benedict cites this source: Theodore Khoury, ed., "Manuel II
Paleologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7e Controverse," So11rce.< Clrrhie1111e.<.
n. 115. (Paris. 1966).
14 Ir seems rhar for the pope's esst"nrial point about the relation of God, soul, faith,
reason, and violence. the specific case of Islam is accidental. He nught have
chosen a different example to make the same point. Thac said, it does not seem
to be accidental that, in present circumstances. he chose Islam.
13
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who view all speech about God as belonging to myth ("Faith," 1]6) and
as a failure to be rational. IS He navigates between two poles, one chat
locates God far above human reason and one that locates God beneath.
The focal point is the articulation of reason (1) against chose who agree
that God has revealed himself, but claim that God's revelation squelches
rationality, and (2) against those who agree that human reason reveals to
us the world, but claim that it reveals a world without God. The same
focus on the proper grasp of reason can be framed negatively: (1) on the
one hand, if reason genuinely were only the modern, shrunken form of
reason, it might deserve condemnation m the name of God; (2) on che
other hand, if God were understood as God is presented by those who
use v10lence to spread belief, reason suggests or supports atheism.16
To address the substance of the emperor's claims, we note that Benedict uses two formulas to express the focal point, one negative and o ne
positive. Negatively, he returns ag.1in and again co the thesis that "not
acting reasonably" or "not acting with foxos" is contrary to God's nature.
Positively, Benedict asserts that God has revealed himself as loxos. The
conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature is, Oenedict
says, a Greek idea. The operung of the Gospel ofJohn (" In the beginning
was the foxos"), Benedict says, pronounces "the final word on the biblical
concept of God" ("Faith," 5). In VJew of the title and central asscmon
of his encyclical Deus Caritas Est, this 1s an extraordmary statement from
Benedict. James Schall po111ts in this direction when he writes, "Thus as
the Pope's first Encyclical might be called 'Deus est O)lape,' so this lecture
is 'Deus est logos.'" 17 Indeed, where the Regensburg speech tends co
make the biblical and Greek view of God sound almost the same, the
encyclical tends to emphasize the fact that the biblical or Christian view
transcends the philosophical view: "The world of the Bible presents us
with a new image of God" (DCE, §9).18 Saying th.u God 1s love is not
the same as saying that God is logos, even if it is true that God 1s both lcixos
Sec Bencdicr, "Faith," 6. Benedict presents the biblical revel;iuon of God as .i
challenge, analogous to the Socrattc challenge, to mythKal presentanons of che
d1v111c. For the Socratic challenge see, for example. Plato's R<'p11blic 377e-391 e.
"'Compare Jurgen Habermas and Joseph R atzinger, 771e Dialectic..< of Semlanzation:
011 R~aso11 a11d Re/iJ1io11, ed. Florian Schuller, trans. Brian McNeil (San Fr.111c1sco:
Ignatius Press, 2005), 64-66.
17 James Schall, 771e Rege11sb11'R Lecture, 123.
111 Also in Deus Caritas Est,§ 11, Benedict writes, "The first novelty of b1blu:.il f.uth
conmts, as we have seen, in its image of God." Additionally. l3ened1ct refers co
Anstotle's thought as "the height of Greek philosophy," bu1 notes tha1 his view
of God falls short of the b1bhcal view precisely on the underst;mdmg of whether
God is the object of love or hunself a pe!'1ona.I lover (ibid .. §9).

15
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and love. In Deus Cnriftls Esr, Benedict writes: "God is the absolute and
ultimate source of all bemg; but this universal principle of creaaon-the
u~111>s, primordial reason-is at the same time a lover with all the passion
of a true love" (DCE, §10). Also, "The ancient world had dimly perceived
that man's real food-what truly nourishes him as man-is ultimately the
L1gos, eternal wisdom: this same L>gos now truly becomes food for usas love" (DCE, § 13). The thesis that God is good in himself and the thesis
that God is benevolent toward human beings, whether taken separately
or in combination, obviously are not equivalent to the thesis that God, in
himself, is love. It has been rcve.iled that God is love; this does not seem
to be the sort of thing that might have been discerned by reason. It
seems, rather, to require revelation (like the doctrine of the Trinity). since
it concerns the inner life of God. The encyclical unambiguously preserves
the difference between the pagan and the biblical understandings of God.
This helps us avoid misreading the speech as if its emphasis on the
congruity of philosophy and theology implied identical understandings
of God. Perhaps when Benedict calls this the final word on the biblical
concept of God, he understands ft~l/<>S as Word and as implying the
doctrine of the Trinity. Obviously, if this is the case, the theological or
biblical sense of fogos exceeds the philosophical sense and yet Benedict
can still assert that agreement obtains between the philosophical and
theological understandings.
Thus Benedict is able to declJre, "From the very heart of the Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined
to faith, Manuel [[ was able to say: Not to act 'with /1~11os' is contrary to
God's nature" ("Faith,'' ,16).1 9 The careful formulation Benedict uses here
preserves Greek thought and Christian faith as two distinct clements; it
does not collapse their difference and fuse them into an identity, even
when both faith and reason use the same formula to speak about God.
Preserving the duality of Christian faith and Greek thought suggests that
philosophy and theology coincide or agree in this thesis and yet it underscores the fact that they assert this thesis in two distinct ways.The Socratic
critique of the irrationality of myth "stands in close analogy" to the biblical revelation and its "new understanding of God," which "separates this
God from all other divinities" ("Faith," ~6). Whereas the Socratic critique
rejects the ignobility of the mythical gods from the standpoint of rationality, the biblical revelation goes deeper than the philosophical grasp of
I?

"Manuel II. hac wirklich ms dem mneren Wesen des chmtlichen Glaubens
heraus und zugleich ms dem Wesen des Griechischen, das s1ch m1t dem Gl.tuben
verschmolzen harce, s.igen konnen: Niche 'nut dem Logos' handeln. !St dem
Wesen Gottes zuwider:·
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the divine and yet confirms, in a way, the philosophical view that God is
not against reason. Philosophic reason recognizes that irrationaliry is not
worthy of God and yet does not and cannot attain to the content of revelation. God alone reveals himself as loxos in a way that transcends every
mythical presentation of the divine, every man-made idol, and even the
divine nature grasped by the philosophers. Benedict speaks of a harmony
here between the Greek philosophical idea and the biblical revelation
that begins in the Old Testament and culminates in John's thesis. Philosophy and philosophy's distinctive manner of grasping this thesis are not
simply absorbed into theology and the theological mode of grasping the
divine with faith. "Harmony" between philosophy and theology requires
them to remain distinct from one another. Philosophy retains its autonomy and integrity and, thus, its distinctive understanding, as a genuine
achievement of reason.20
Reason and Science
The first eight paragraphs of the Regensburg speech are devoted mainly
to this encounter of the Greek and biblical understandings of the divine.
In the remainjng eight paragraphs of the speech, the H oly Father traces
the relation of Christian faith and human reason from what he identifies
as an initial consonance in the recognition of the reasonableness of God
and God's ways to the rejection of this integration and the effort to
debcllenize Christianity. Benedict identifies three waves or stages in the
project of dchellenization. He characterizes the first stage as part of the
Reformation-era attempt to bypass philosophy and to eliminate rational
metaphysics in order to return to faith rooted solely in Scripture ("Faith ;'
~10). He gives only a brief mention of the contemporary, third stage of
dehellenization, which he characterizes as the attempt to separate the
H ellenistic culture surrounding the early Church from the simple and
20

For a complete discussion of the distinction summarized here between the Chrisrian sense of the divine and the sense of the divine evident to pagan philosophers
and theologians, see Robert Sokolowski, T71e God of Fair/1 a11tl Re11.<011: Fo1111datiom
of Cliri.<tian T71eolo,(!y (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press,
1993), especially chapters 5 and 10, md C1'ristia11 Fai11' a111I H11ma11 U11dersta11di1~f!,
especially chapters I through 4. Sokolowski emphasizes the "shift" in human
thought that is required once we come to understand the sense of the divine
required in Christian belief. Christian faith does not simply add to the underscanding of God that is achieved by reason; Christian faith presents a new understanding of the divine, which, as a matter of historical fact, was simply not
achieved apart from revelarion (see Dm.< Can'ta.< Est, §9). The achievements of
reason independent of revelation are not negated, but appreciated anew in the
context of a deeper understanding.
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prior and presumably universal New Testament message ("Faith," iJ14).
Benedict devotes by far the greater part of his remarks to the second stage
of the dehellenizing process. To illustrate this stage, he singles out as its
"outstanding representative" Adolf von H arnack, whose "goal was to
bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it,
that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such
as faith in Christ's divinity and the t riune God" (" Faith," iJl 1). H e meanc
to set theology in its rightful place within the university shaped by
modern scientific reason. The "harmony" between faith and reason that
would be the goal of this project mimics the harmony between faith and
reason that emerged from the original and, in Benedict's view, providential encounter between the biblical message and Greek thinking ("Faith,"
iJS). The original harmony obtained when a philosophically purified
understanding of the divine nature was coordinated with the elevating
message of Christian revelation; the new harmony attempts to rid theology of those elements that cannot be drawn down to a "self-linutation"
(Selbstbescliriink1111J1) ("Faith,'' iJl I) and "reduction" ( Verkiirzung) ("Faith,"
iJ12) of reason. T he critique of this modern concept of reason is the H oly
Father's target in the whole speech (see especially " Faith," iJlS). M odernity constricts reason, and then the second stage of dehellenization
attempts to constrict faith to the standards laid down by the constricted
form of reason. T hese standards are, according to Pope Benedict, Cartesianism (which he identifies as a form of Platonism) and empiricism
("Faith," ,]11).
The story of modernity remains complex and controversial; doubtless,
there will be criticisms brought against his claim concerning the synthesis of these two poles of thought. T here is need for a much fuller development of Benedict's understanding of the synthesis of Cartesianism and
empiricism. At the present time, it is useful to add a few comments about
modernity, even if they must remain brief and incomplete. Cartesianism,
or Platonism, "presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its
intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter
works and use it efficiently" ("Fait h," iJl 1). The empirical component is
"nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the
possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can
yield decisive certainty" ("Faith," iJl 1). In these formulations, Cartesianism and empiricism are essentially epistemological in their focus. They
express the relation between the soul, or mind, and narure, or matter. In
order to understand the synthesis of these two elements, we note tl1at
their point of contact is the use or ma1upu1ation of nature. Modernity
comes to light, then, as a search for certain knowledge of nature for the
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sake of mastery. Benedict does not expressly say so, but it is possible to
understand the synthesis of Carcesianism and empiricism m terms of this
overarching goal of mastery. In this understanding, the mathematical
conception of nature is not accidentally related to the goal of mastery.
Instead, we recognize that the drive to master nature effectively requires
that nature be conceived mathematically. The modern concept of nature,
in Hans Jonas's memorable phrase, contains "manipulability at its theoretical core."21 As Cartesianism and empiricism agree in the understanding of nature, so they agree in the concept correlative to nature: soul, or
mind. Rationalists like Descartes and empiricists like John Locke, whatever else their differences, share to a certain extent what may be called
the modern docmne of the soul. According to chis view, the soul is the
principle of human knowledge, but it is not the form of the body and
not the source of motion in the living body. Plato, Aristode, Lucretius,
and Thomas Aquinas, to name a few important representatives of the premodern tradition, understood the soul to be the principle of human
knowledge, but also the principle of vital motion in the body. The
modern approach, by contrast, conceives soul essentially as a mind or ego
or self, which remains problematically related to the human body. 22 The
human body is understood to be one part of the larger material whole,
called nature, the manipulable object of modern science.23Thus, the epistemological standards of modern thought (expressed in Cartcsianism/
Platonism and empiricism) can be understood to be intimately related to
the modern goal of the mastery of na cure. 24 Mastery of nature is pursued
for the relief and benefit of man's estate, that is, with a humanitarian
Hans Jonas, "Seventeenth Cenrury and After: The Mearung of the Scientific and
Technological Rcvoluuon," in Pf1ilo.wpltirul Essays (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 48. The significance of the new concept of
narure is stressed by R.attinger in his dialogue with Habcrmas. See Jiirgen
Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, 71re Dialectic.< of Sewlarization: On Reason and
Religion, 69-71. The sepuauon of reason from nature IS another way of expressmg the distmcuon of soul, or uund, from body, or narure.
22 Tb.IS concepuon of soul explains why, m Deus Caritas Est (§5). Benedict finds it
necessary to correct a prevalent ffilSUndersandmg and emphasize the uruon of soul
and body in order to arucufate the proper understanding of human erotic love.
2~ Cf. Jiirgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, 71re Dialectics of Sewlarization: 011
Reason a11d Rel(11io11, 65.
24 See Jacob Klem, "Modern Rationalism," Lect11re5 and Essays, ed. Robert B.
Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis, Md.: St. john's College Press,
1985), 53-64, Richard Kennington, "The 'Teaching of Narure' m Descartes's
Soul Doctrine," R,.,,1ttv of .Wetaplrysic.• 26 (1972): 86-117; Richard Kennington,
"Descartes and Mastery of Nature," in °'Jla111s111, Mediane, a11d Metap/1ysics, ed
Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrccht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978). 201-23
21
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intention. And, according to the founders of modern thought, it is this
beneficence, more than anything else, that disnnguishes rhe modern form
of reason from the pre-modern form.25 T he goal is to solve, through
human agency, the troubles besetting human life. T his humanitarianism
arises in the image and likeness of the service of charity, but it is not charity. It is a this-worldly solution to this world's problems. It substitutes for
the theological solution to original sin. At its heart, it is the modern
origin of what, in Deus Caritas Est, l3enedict calls "social assistance." It is
thus also unsurprising to see chat the attempt to conform Christian revelation to modern scientific reason "would end up reducing Christianity
to a mere fragment of its former self" (" Faith," , [13).
Against this constriction offaith to a shrunken reason, Benedict proposes
that faith and reason must come together"in a new \.vay" ("Faith," 15). H e
deems it not enough co return to previous formulations and to repeat
what was once adequate. It is not sufficient to declare that "truth does not
contradict truth" and pronounce a blessing on modern science with
naive optimism that, in the end, all it shows will prove to be in harmony
with one's catechism. Modern science is a form of reason, but a
constricted form. T he second stage of dehellenization shows that some
advocates of modern science do not rest content with coexistence alongside Christian faith. The second stage asserts or presupposes the illegitimacy of faith in the face of that form of reason. In chis conflict, modern
scientific reason, owing especially co its apparent confirmation in our
reliance on the technology science generates ("Faith," ~ 1 1 ), has tremendous rhetorical superiority over Christian faith for most people. Science
is the authority we acknowledge in common by the way we live. Naive
optimism that truth docs not contradict truth is, in chis context, akin co
laying down one's arms and giving away the store, so to speak. Benedict
himself takes up metaphorical (as opposed to rcaJ) arms to stake om and
defend a broadened grasp of the role of reason in human life. The scientific form of reason must be given its due, but the broader claims of a
more complete sense of reason must also be advanced.
Consequently, we are faced wuh a reducrion of the radius of science
and reason. one which needs to be questioned .
. . . If science as a whole is thi~ and this alone, then it is man himself
who en<ls up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about
our ongm and desuny, the quesaons raised by religion and erlucs. then
have no place withm the purview of collective reason as defined by
2; See Francis Bacon, TI1e Atlm1ue111rn1

of Le11mi1~1/. ed. G. W. l{jcchin

Melbournc:J. M. Dent&. Sons, 1973), 34-35.

(London and

Pope Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason

639

"science," so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the
subjective. ("Faith," ~12-13)

Benedict's "critique of modern reason from within" (Selbstkritik der
111odcrne11 Vernwift) ("Faith;' ~15), then, aims at the reinvigoration of a
broader sense of human reason. The proper exercise of human reason
does not begin with and is not to be identified with modern science. H e
wants to reassert the use of reason that precedes science and that helps us
discover the need for science and establish the goals and methods of
science. In our pre-scientific or extra-scientific lives, we properly exercise
reason in non-scientific ways.As Robert Sokolowski has argued, we exert
our rationality not only in traditional logical functions of judgment and
inference, but also and most broadly in the introduction of syntax into
our experience. 26 Reason is at work in all intelligent perception and in
the formation of opinion. These sorts of exercises of reason prepare for
the specialized form that is science, which never completely replaces the
need for the original, intelligent encounter with the world. Pope Benedict is not only reminding us that modern science presupposes pre-scientific e:>.."Perience in the world. He is more fundamentally defending
philosophy and theology as the proper forms of reason for addressing
essential human questions, which arise necessarily from ordinary experience. H e is defending them as proper forms of rational inquiry.
Theology, as "inquiry into the rationality of faith" ("Faith," ~15), and
philosophy, as inquiry into the rationality of ordinary human experience,
belong in the university alongside modern science.27 The rationality of
philosophy and theology needs to be rearticulated in the context of
modern science, over against the tendency to reduce all that precedes
science and all that is not science to mere opinion, prejudice, or superstition
("Faith," ~13). Descartes provides the paradigmatic expression of the attitude animating this tendency when he formulates his methodical doubt as
the dismissal, as utterly false, of all opinions that can in the least be doubted.
His subsequent re-admission of some of these opinions occurs on the
terms of his rational method, which he brings forward as the sole arbiter of
26

27

See Sokolowski, "The Autonomy of Philosophy in Fides et Ratio," chapter 1 in
C/rristi/111 Faitlr and H11111an U11del'$ta11dit1J!. See also his book Phe110111e11olll.J!y of tlie
H111111111 Person (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 2008).
Again, it is important co preserve philosophy and theology as cwo forms of
rational inquiry. The two may even consider the very same experiences as starting points, but they do so in different ways. "For philosophy and, albeit i11 a differe111 way, for theology, listening co the great experiences and insights of the
religious traditions of humanity, and chose of the Christian faith in particular. is
a source of knowledge" ("Faith," 116) (emphasis added].
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truth and falsiry.211 It is undeniable, however, that Descartes's method and
the argument he 1mkes for its superioriry to "the speculaave philosophy of
the schools" are themselves the fruit of a philosophical exercise of reason
and not the fruit of scientific rcason.2'1 Science is a derivative form of
human reason and we suffer great harm if we acquiesce to the widespread
aversion to the non-scientific thinking that underlies scientific rationaliry
("Faith," 16). Benedict pursues this line of argument 111 his concluding
paragraph. He locates the necessary origins of modern scientific reason in
uses of reason more fimdament,11 than science itself. Moreover, ultimate
questions belong to "other modes and planes of thought-to philosophy
and theology" ("Faith," ,it 6). This kind of argument opens the way for
those who are formed by modern science and respect its achievements to
catch sight of the fact that science is not self-sufficient and cannot be
exclusively the perfection of human reason.
Thus Benedict\ speech is primarily philosophical. More precisely, in
the name of theology he calls for the completion of what is essentially a
philosophical task: " The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason,
and not the denial of its grandeur--this is the programme with which a
theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time"
(" Faith," ~16). His "self-critique of modern reason" ("Faith," ~15) points
to the need to draw in the claim of modern scientific reason to hold
exclusive power co determine the true and the false and the need to
expand our recognition of the range of reason's activities. Denedict's
speech does not reject modern reason, but rationally displays that it represents a " reduction of the radius of science and reason" (" Faith," 12). He
calls for us to re-create the logicaJ space necessary for the philosophical
exercise of reason, which space 1s closed off whenever the positivistic
interpretation of reason dominates. This philosophical achievement also
makes room for a genuinely rational theology. The completion of Benedict's proposaJ, then, requires us to articulate the proper character of
philosophicaJ reason such that it may be brought together with faith "in
a new way" ("Faith," 1jl 5). The model for the new harmony is the original harmony identified by Benedict earlier in his speech ("Faith," 1j5-8).
The new harmony cannot, however, be a simple repetition of old formulas. The old formulas will not hold the same power until we reinvigorate
the philosophical exercise of reason in the contemporary context. The
new way of bringing faith and reason together, consequently, also requires
us to articulate a broadened concept of human reason that can acknowlix Compare Desc.mes's "First Med11auon .. w11h his "Sixth Med1u.uon .. in his ,\fetf11111io11s cllr First 1'/1ifosoplry.
2'! Consui<.'r the fi~1. second. and sixch parts of Descartes's Di~<1umr 011 Mrtlwtf
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edge the achievement of modern science without being overwhelmed by
the constriction of reason that has characterized the dominant interpretation of modern science.

R eason and Faith in Harmony
In the R egensburg speech Pope Benedict articulates the possibility of the
harmonious interaction of fai th and reason. In the encyclical Deus C11rit11s Est, he displays the harmonious exercise of faith and reason in the
contemporary context. In the speech, Benedict carves out the space for
theology and philosophy between an Islamic form of anti-reason .md a
scientific form of self-constrained reason.The emphasis in the speech falls
on the poles against which he distinguishes the common and bro,1der
form of reason. In the encyclical, Benedict displays the co-operntive relationship between philosophical and theological use~ of reason. The final
section of this essay draws attention to three ways in which our reason in
its ordinary and its philosophical forms can function in harmony with
Christian faith. What follows does not provide a summary o r analysis of
the doctrine of the entire encyclical, but only illustrates the relation of
re.ison and faith discernible within it.

Reaso11 as Preparatory for Faith
Just as the R egensburg speech concludes with the necessity of recogmzing the .1ctivity of reason that precedes science, so the encyclical recognizes th.it reason operates prior to one's encounter with revelation.
Indeed, the necessary exercise of reason and of philosophy prior to the
emergence of science has a kind of paraJlel in the uses of reason that are
presupposed by revelation and theology. Faith does not do away with the
need for the natural and rational grasp of things. Instead, any effort to
make the faith known must appeal to and draw upon the natural exercise of reason in order to make its content accessible. In the words of the
Byzantine emperor, "Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the
ability to speak well dlld to reason properly, without violence and threats"
("Faith," ~3). The soul's reasonableness precedes acceptance of the faith,
and the one who spreads the fa1th must respect and appeal to this reasonableness. Without drawing explicit attention to it, Benedict carefully
displays his awareness of this rhetorical situation.
One illustration, then, of harmony between reason and faith arises
becau-;c our natural experience of the world and our understanding of that
experience provide the basis for our understanding the content of divine
revelation. As Benedict puts it, Christianity is not "detached from the vital
relations fundament.11 to human existence" and not "cut off from the
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complex fabnc of human Life"; he goes so far as co say that philosophical
reflections on that experience can bring us co the threshold of faith (DCE,
§7). Our natural understanding of the world, e~pecially as ic is perfected in
ph1losoplucal reasoning, can be preparatory for faith. If we cannot ascend by
our own powers from ordinary experience to faith, revelation muse descend
to our level and be expressed with reference to that ordinary experience.30
Thus, when it is revealed or when we are told, for example, that God is our
father, we already have experience of and underscandmg of what fatherhood is. Whether our personal experience of foe hers is good or bad, skewed
or insightful, we know that there are good and bad fathers and we know
something of what constitutes the excellence of a good father. Tlus cognitive grasp of fatherhood precedes and conditions our access co what faith
proposes about God as father. We understand, at first, the meaning of the
revelation of God as father in light of our natural understanding of fatherhood and-apart from direct and miraculous illumination by God--our
grasp of this revelation is Limited by the imperfections of our knowledge of
the natural meaning of fatherhood . The newly revealed theological teaching becomes accessible because of what we <1lready know about fathers.
A similar thing happens when we try to understand the mystery of
God's love and the statement chat God is love. The explication of che theological meanmg of love requires preliminary attention to the ordinary
understanding oflove:"we cannot simply prescind from the meaning of the
word in the different cultures and in present-day usage" (DCE, §2). Thus,
in the first part of the encyclical, the H oly Father emphasizes that the word
love has many different meanings in human discourse, and he begins from
chis multiplicity of meanings (DCE, §2). About these multiple meanings,
he asks essentially a philosophical question-whether love is one in form
or many. Benedict tries to show that "the message oflove proclaimed to us
by the Bible :ind the Church's Tradition has some points of contact with
the common human experience of love" (DCE, §7). God's revelation
about love does not confront us with something wholly new, something
completely alien from our experience, and .Benedict emphasizes the
"intrinsic link" between God's love and human love (DCE, §1). In addition to the human experience of love, there are whole schools of thought
about what love is or means and what God is, and it is in this context that
-"' In the first puagraph of the encychcal. Benedict quotes the First Lener ofJohn
(4: 16): "We h.ive come to know .ind co believe m the love God has for us." In
the very next sentence he writes," IM> /iml(' ((1111<' to belier'<' i11 God'.< /or•t•: in these
words lhe Christian can express the fundamental decision of his life." The decision is necess;irily preceded by some knowledge or understanding of whal is co
be accepled m faith.
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God's revelation about love and about God as love appears. The Holy
Father appeals not only to experience but especially to the authoritative
opinions and thoughtful appropriations of that experience.JI Revelation
does not obliterate human reason and it does not teach something so
unprecedented that we have to abandon what we already know about the
world and human nature. Instead, revelation first draws from and then transcends our ordinary understanding oflove and the philosophical reflections
on that ordinary undcrstanding.32 Faith preserves the sphere in which
natural human reason must be cultivated and perfected. In revelation we
find the completion of reason, and we find unanticipated truths that are
intelligible in their difference from what reason has disclosed already about
nature. Just as our appreciation of divine paternity as first in itself never
allows us to dispense with the understanding of the fatherhood that is first
for us, so our understanding that God is love requires our thoughtful grasp
of love as we meet with it naturally and as we grasp its several forms
through reason and experience.This is one way in which philosophy assists
theology; it helps prepare our understanding of the distinctively Christian
as something that confirms reason and goes beyond 1t.
Reason as Self-Critical
Sometimes, instead of preparing us to grasp the content of revelation, our
natural grasp of things becomes an obstacle to our acceptance of the faith.
We have seen a prominent example of this in the Regensburg speech. The
modern form of scientific reason presents a formidable obstacle to faith.
Benedict's response to this is a "critique of modern reason fiom within"
(Selbstkritik der modernen Vernwifi) ("faith;' ~1 5). As pope, as a religious
leader, he advances an argument that takes part in the self-correction of
reason. He does not simply condemn positivistic science in the name of
faith. Instead, he makes a rational argument about the proper use of
reason.33 In the encyclical, we see another illustration in Benedict's
recounting of an objection against Church teaching on charity. The objec31 The very first foornote m the encyclical 1s to a text of N1eczsche, in which Nietzsche declares that Chmu.mity has corrupted the natural undemanding of rros
(Deus Carita.< Est, §3). Benedict appeals to a philosopher to make revelacion clear.
32 When Benedict presenu the biblical view of God as both l~s and love
(discussed above), he adds:" Eros is thus supremely ennobled, yet at the same time
it is so purified as to become one with 0.l{ape" (Deus Can.ta.< Est, §10).
33 James Schall emphasizes tlus m his mtroducuon to 111t Rtgerub11rg l..L!111" (South
Bend, Ind.: St. Augusune's Press, 2007). "We are not asked to 'believe· the Pope
in some theologically technical sense of that noble word. We are asked rather to
grasp his argument" (10). Again, "Thus, this whole lecture is based upon a
sustained argument about reason" ( 16).
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tion is raised in the name ofJmtice as understood in Marxism (DCE, §26).
Benedict introduces Marxism as insisting that the Church's charitable
acovicy participates tn the preservation of an UllJUSt social order. Through
the construction of a just socicry, Marxism aims to eliminate the need for
charicy, which, to the Marxist, seems to be an ineffective or deplorable
sub~titute for justice. Benedict says, "There is admittedly some truth to chis
argument, but also much that is mistaken" (DCE, §26). I le goes on co say
both that Marxist clam1S about the solution to social problems have proven
to be illusory and that there must be "dialogue with all those seriously
concerned for humanicy and for the world in which we live" (DCE, §27).
The correction of the illusions of Marxist thought can be made authoritatively on the basis of revelation, but it is also important that this t.1ke place
at the level of practical reason and political philosophy.34 Benedict refers to
the illusions, but the rcsponsibilicy for achievmg justice in the political
order remains with pr.:ictical reason and political philosophy. It does not
become the responsibilicy of the Church's charitable activity to produce a
jmc social order. In light of the faith, the pope urges a corrected exercise of
practical reason.
This correction of reason does not involve replacing rca~on with
something else. Faith docs not supplant reason in any of its forms, as 1f
faith could render mathematics or medicine or politic.ii thought unnecessary. The pursuit of justice as properly the function of practical reason
is emphatically reaffirmed by the encyclical (DCE, §28). One could go
so far as to say that the encyclical enjoins on us the rational pursuit of the
question that animates Plato's Republic:
The St.1tc must inevitably f.ice the question of how justice can be
achieved here and now. But tlus presupposes .111 even more r.idical quesoon: wh,u 1s jusnce?The problem 1s one of prncocal reason: but 1f rl·ason
is to be exercised properly, 1t must undergo t·onstam punficaoon, ~mce
it can never be completely free of the danger of a certam ethical blindness caused by the dazzlmg effect of power and speoal mterests
Here politics and faith meet. Fdlth by its specific nanire 1s an
encounter with the living God-an encounter opening up new horizons extending beyond the sphere of reason But it 1s .ilso a punfymg
·' 4

Virgil Ne111oianu ("The Church and the Secul.ir Escabhshmcnc," 17- 42) makes
similar poinc in regard to Cudinal R.itz.111ger's dpproach to Habermas in their
dialogue held in Janu.iry 2004 .ind published. 111 English, as Tiie Di1ilt<t1b of Stm"1rizc1tic111: 011 Rc11so11 ,,,,J R!'i(11ic111. Ne11101dm1wrnes:"Thus1t .ippedrs tlutjoscph
Ratzinger was wise to accept .i sociolmtorical level of reference, r.ithcr than to
w1thdr.iw haughnly into the doma111 of dogm.mc theoloizy as had been often
done 111 the past. Such a withdrawal mevitably closes a number of doors Jnd
raises perhaps inmperablc dininilties w J gem11ne dialog" (.34).
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force for reason itself. From Cod's standpoint, faith liberates reason from
itS bhnd spotS and therefore helps it co be ever more fully itself. Faith
enables re:ison to do its work more effecovely and co sec its proper
obJeCt more dearly. (DCE, §28a)

This purification of reason urges that reason be reason. It does not add
missing insights that are in principle inaccessible to reason.There arc c,1scs
where revelation opens up an understanding of God or of love that docs
not appear to natural human reason. There, revelarion takes us "beyond
the sphere of reason." Here, Benedict claims that faith helps reason
accomplish better the activities that are proper to the realm of human
reason.35 The inquiry into what justice is and the attempt to achieve
justice in deed are casks that belong co the secular realm ("the State"), and
Benedict denies that the Church or religious leaders should usurp this
function. The Church's role is limited to cncouragmg .111d assisting the
political agents in their own proper activities. This means, among other
things, that Benedict and the Church urge the pursuit of political life
precisely as the achievement of practical reason and polit1cal philosophy,
not as expressions of faith or the work of the Church. Political movements and forms of political thought ltke Marxism require a reasoned,
philosophical response, not simply a theological one. The Church is not
indifferent to the character of the political order, but she recognizes that
the care of the political order does not belong to her, but requires the
cultivation of reason.36
Much of the encyclical appeals to this self-critical form of reason. Just
as we have seen that a central goal of the second part is to purify the desire
for justice from its corruption into Marxism, it seems true to say that a
central goal of the first part is to purify eros &om its corruption into
bodily eroticism. For example, in his response to the objection made by
Nietzsche (that Christianity had poisoned eros) (DCE, §3), Benedict
repeatedly emphasizes that the Christian confirmation of the goodness of
the body is an attempt to heal and purify eros. He says that the merely
This 1s wlut was meanc when we concluded the second secaon of dus e\s.iy h}
saying chat Benedict's Regensburg speech 1s primarily ph1lmoplucal. It pnmmlr
aims co correct reason's grasp of reason's proper activity.
36 There is need for additional reflection on the relation of che political co111111umty to the message of the Gospel. In particular, such reflection may help to
explain why the Holy Father refers co Gods wish co make lil of hunumty ".i
single fmuly" (Dms Canlas Est, § 19). In order to understand why he s.iys 11
should be ;i single fanuly-as disunct from. for example. .1 smgle pohuc.tl
community-we require an intelligent grasp of the d1snncuons among fonm of
humJn association.

35
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bodily or "biological" indulgence in ems, its reduction to "pure 'sex,' "
amounts to a dehumanized and degraded manifestation of erotic love
(DCE, §§4 and 5 et passim). The C hristian approach is to "restore" eriis to
its proper and "authentic grandeur" (DCE, §5). It is not the theological
meaning of eros that is at issue here, but the natural meaning of human
sexual love. The restoration occurs when human beings rccogmze their
nature as a union of body and soul and reject misinterpretations of their
nature as either pure spirit or pure body. Benedict uses a brief anecdote
concerning the philosopher Descartes and tbe scientist Gassendi to illustrate these mistaken views (DCE, §5). We note that the anecdote illustrates
the modern doctrine of the soul discussed above. In the re-assertion of
body-soul unity, Christian faith confirms and reinforces what natural
reason first shows us about ourselves and urges that philosophy continue
to do its own proper work. While it is possible to condemn bodily eroticism and materialist Marxism from the superior vantage point of divine
revelation, it is also true that the proper exercise of reason can show the
way to overcoming the defects of each of these misunderstandings of
human nature. Benedict displ.1y~ his understanding of the role of faith in
facilitating just this corrected or purified exercise of reason.37

Reaso11 as Preser11i11g Disti11ctio11s
We saw that the first way in which philosophy harmonizes with faith
involved preparing for the reception of the understanding revealed by God.
In this third way, philosophy helps preserve the distinctiveness of what is
revealed. lt helps us recognize that faith really is different from what reason
shows us. For example, a clear understandmg of pagan accounts of divinity
37

In addition to the exJmples discussed in this paragraph, it 1s worth noting that
cert.Jin fonnulaoons in the encyd1cal sugge~t Benedict 1s pomung subtl) to v.mous philosoplucal errors. For ex.unple, he '' ntes, "When we consider the nnmensiry of others' needs, we c~n. on the one hand, be driven tow.1rds an ideology that
would aim at doing wh.u God's governance of the world appuendy cannot: fully
resolving every problem" (Dem Caritll< E.<r, §36). Contrast John Stuart M1U: "Yet
no one whose opinion deserves a momcm's consideration c.111 doubt that most of
the great pomive ev1h of the world are in themselves removable. and will, if
human affairs co nunuc to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits.
Poverty, in Jny sense implying su£fering, may be completely exunguishcd by the
wisdom of society combined with the good sense and providence of individuals."
Mill. Uriliwn.11115111 (lndJJnapohs; H.tcken, 1979), 14. In another case, 11 would be
mtcresting to 11wcst1gatc whether Benedict's tream1ent of the possibility of a
commandment to love (sec Dru.< Caritns E.<t, §§14 and l<r!H) is or i$ not meant
to correct Kant's thesis: "Love .is an inclination cannot be commanded" Kam,
Fo1111dano11.< of tlie .\.lrtdp/1y.•ics of M1m1L<, 2nd ed., trans. Lewis Wh11e Beck (Upper
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 15.
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permits us to appreciate wh,1t is distinctive in the Christian sense of God.
However similar Greek philosophical accounts might seem to the Christian account, the God who freely creates out of nothing is genuinely different from any understanding of God arrived at by the philosophers.
Recognizing these differences helps us to see that Christian faith is nocjust
one more religion alongside the others (DCE, §§9 and 11).3~ ln the first
way, then, reason or philosophy prepares for theology by helping us to
understand natures before we articulate the lncamaoon, by helping us to
undersr.1nd opinion before we articulate faith, and by help111g us to understand signs before we articulate the sacraments as effective signs of grace. In
the third way, we use philosophical understanding to prevent the misunderstanding of the Incarnation as a kind of hybridization, of faith as just
another op1111011, or of the sacraments as ordinary reminders or symbols of
absent thmgs. Philosophy helps preserve the distinction and resist the
reduction of Christian mysteries to simpler, natural understandings. Unless
we resist it, our grasp of the natural order inclines us to reinterpret divine
things in .1 merely natural way. This pull toward the earth and earthly
meanings continues to exist even for believers.As we become familiar with
Christianiry we are liable to forget how strange it is and how much it
requires us to transcend our ordinary grasp of things. The robust exercise
of philosophical reason can preserve the otherness of faith to reason.
One important example of this tendency and its correction on display
in the encyclical has already been touched upon to some extent. The preference for earthly justice to divine chariry may be traced at least as far back
as Judas, when he objected to the anointing of the Lord's feet (John
12:4-5). This objection, that there is nothing more important than the
elimination of worldly sorrows, has never really and finaUy gone away. The
urge toward an idealized, material equaliry as justice seems to belong to
human nan1re. At any rate, it is repeatedly necessary to avoid confusing
Christian charity, understood as service, especiaUy to the poor, with its
look- alike, mere humanitarianism or "social assistance" (DCE, §31) or
humanitarianism. The possibility of this mistake is evidenced by Julian the
Apostate. He med to initiate a pagan "equivalent" to the Christian service
of chariry (DCE, §24). One can perhaps produce, in parallel to the
Church's charity, a secular system of"social assistance" such that the two
operations yield identical material results. Both activities would be recognizably good, but Christian charitable activity is always something more
Jll

...

Add1uon.i.ll)•, tlus awueness of the contr~st between che Chmn~n and the pa~n
senses of d1vmity helps us to trunk about the emperor's reJecuon of the God of
Islam. To spe.ik of a God that exceeds lo.l!o.< is to speak of a different God. This
insight helps us recognize that not every form of faith is faich in the same sense.
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than its material manifestation. The service of chariry is always for the sake
of something beyond the worldly good it accomplishe~. Its meaning is not
limited to and its success is not defined by the degree to which it eliminates worldly evils. The inabiliry to understand this sort of d1stincoon leads
to a corruption of chariry.39 Even some Christians seem to believe that
charity 1s nothing more than faJth-based "social assistance.. (DCE, §31).
They allow their natural desire to eliminate human suffering (sec D CE,
§20) to overwhelm their understanding of the full good of human beings.
This leads to d1e inabiliry to recognize chat there are evils worse than bodily
suffering, with the result that they come to mink the proper Christian attitude is to eliminate all forms of suffering by any available means. The prdctical consequences of this confusion appear when people come to mink
that the Church must advocate condom use 111 response to AIDS or that
physician-assisted suicide provides genuine relief of suffering. Often we
take 1t for granted that Christian faith must agree with what makes sense
to us rationally. Sometimes, however, as was articulated in me previous
section, the faith pomts to a correction of reason. On omer occasions, the
faim also requires us to transcend reason and to recognize something
higher. Thus Christian faim articulates an understanding of the role of
suffering that goes beyond philosophical reason. Clear recognition of the
difference between "social assisc.mce" and chanry preserves the distinctiveness of the Christian response to suffering.
The key to exercising reason in this role 1s attending to and preserving what may appear to be small differences between the faith and our
natural understanding. In the Regensburg speech, one such small difference comes to light through what appears to be a misquotation or
mistaken paraphrase of Plato's Pltaed(l. The apparent impossibiliry of
removing controversy and disagreement from philosoph1cal arguments
has always led some to want to dismiss philosophy altogether. Plato's
dialogue presents characters frustrated with confusion by the arguments
they are considering. Benedict attributes the following statement to
Socrates ("Faim," 16):
It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all
these false noaons that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked
all talk about being, buc in tlus way he would be deprived of the truth
of existence and would suffer a great loss.
3'> See Francis Bacon, 171e Ad1't11ue111e111 of Lcar11i11,f!, 4-8 and 34-35. Bacon amculates

a fond of scienafic hunumtanamsm that preserves the use of the word "charity,"
but not the meamng. Once aga111, because of the connecuon to mastery of nature,
the humanitarian goal of modern philosophy is of tremendous significance for thr
Regensburg speech.
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A more Literal and complete rranslanon of the te>..'1: runs as follows:
"Then, Phaedo," he said, "his condition would be a pitiable one if,
when chere was in face some argument that was true and stable and
capable ofbemg detected, somebody-through his associaang with the
very son of arguments that somenmes seem co be true and sometimes
not--should not blame himself or hJS own anlessness but should end
up in his distress be mg only too pleased co push the blame off lumself
and onto the arguments, and from that moment on should finish out
the rest of his life hating and reviling arguments and should be robbed
of the truth and knowledge of the things that are."40

Plato places in the mouth of Socrates an exhortation co avoid the error
of misology; the exhortation borders on accusing those who hate philosophical discourse of embracing a great eviJ.41 It is a sin chat consists in
ignorance and the rejection of the means to its remedy. Benedict recasts
Socrates's statement as an exculpation and almost as an expression of
forgiveness. As Benedict sees it, there is forgiveness for those who fail in
this serious task. When the horizon of faith transcends the boundaries of
reason, the work of reason itself must be re-appraised in this new light.
In Deus Caritas Est, another instance of this son of contrast between
natural understanding and Christian faith comes to light when we attend
co the fact that Benedict singles out eros as the form of love chat is most
suitable for expressing the teaching that God is love. Erotic or sexual love
is the first form of human love that Benedict speaks of at length (DCE, §3).
He highlights it as the form that is especially useful for bringing out the
meanmg of divine love. It is not the only form he might have chosen.
The example of Aqumas alone is enough to show that friendship might
have been used to explicate charity. Benedict himself points to the
importaJlce of friendship in the following way. Near the end of section
12, he identifies the contemplation of the pierced side of Christ as the
way to understand the truth that God is love, which is the starting-point
of the encyclical and, he says, the point from which to begin defining
love. But, as we learn in § 19, the character of this love is Jrie11dsliip, which
~1

The translauon 1s from Plato's Plraedo, trans. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage. and Eric
Salem (Newburyport, M;iss.: Focus Classical Library, 1998), 68 (at 90c8--d7). In
this translation, the four uses of"argument" correspond to four uses of forms of
AOYO~. For the Greek original, see Plato"s Pl1aedo, ed. John Burnet (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1911). Benedict's citation runs as follows: "'Cf. 90 c--d. For this
text, cf. also R . Guard101. Der Tod deJ Sokmtfs, 5th ediuon, Mamz-Paderborn
1987, pp. 218-21"
4 1 "'[F]or it's not possible,' he said, 'for anybody to experience a greater evil than
haung argumencs.'" Plato's Plraedo, trans. Eva Brann, 67 (at 89d2-3)).
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is identified by the reference in this passage to John 15: 13: "Greater love
h.1s no m.in than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." It is
not chat Christ was slain that is indicated by the pierced side, but that he
had laid down his life for fri ends. Friendship is central for Benedict. This
forces the question upon us: why docs Benedict not devote more attention to friendship?
The answer to this question appears from a consideration of what
Oenedict does say about friendship. H e mentions "love between friends"
among the initial senses of the meaning of the word, but it "fades" from
prominence, along with "love of work" and "love of one's profession," in
comparison to "the very epitome of love," that between man and woman
(DCE, §2). lt docs not seem co be accidenul that friendship recedes into
the background. Benedict appeals to three New Testament words for love:
rrc>s, pliiliti (the love of friendship), and axapc (DCE, §3). In the next few
pages, Benedict reduces these three to "two fundamental words: eros, as a
term to indicate 'worldly' love and fl)!tl/JC, referring to love grounded in and
shaped by faith" (DCE, §7). Indeed, the title of the section in which he
identifies the three New Testament terms for love mentions only erc>s and
11,1111pe. Articulating the proper unity of these /1110 dimensions in the o ne
reality of love (sec DCfl, §§7, 8, and 10) is the focus of the first part of the
encyclical.What happened to friendship? It has not been simply excluded,
but invested with a new meaning. Oenedict points out that che love
obtaining between Jesus and the disciples is friendship, but it is friendship
"with added depth of meaning" (DCE, §3). The pierced side of Christ
(DCE, § 12) shows us that Christ's love for his disciples is expressed in an
act of self-oblation and the Eucharist draws us into this act (DCE, §13).
"This sacrament.11 'mysticism' is social in character, for in sacramental
communion I become one with the Lord, like all the other communicants.... Union with Christ is also union with all those to whom he gives
himself" (DCfl, §1 4). The result is that the commandment to love others
b "now universalized" and embraces all mankind as neighbors (DCE,
§15). "The parable of the Good Samaritan remains as a standard which
imposes universal love towards the needy whom we cncounter 'by chance'
(cf. Lk 10:31), whoever they may be" (DCE, §25b). In this light,Jesus' love
for his disciples comes to be, not the singling out of his preferred companions, but a few instances of Jesus' universal love for all mankind. Needless
to say, such universal love is not something Aristotle, at least, understood
among the many forms of friendship. In .Benedict's presentation of the
commandment to love all human beings, there is little or no room for the
selectivity of the ordinary form of human friendship. Benedict seems to
assert as much in the paragraph concluding the first part of the encyclical.
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Love of neighbour is thus shown to be possible in the way proclaimed
by the Bible, by Jesus. It consists in the very fact that, in God and with
God, ! love even the person whom l do not like or even know.This can
only take place on the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an
encounter which has become a communion of will, affecting my feelings. Then! learn to look on this other person not simply with my eyes
and my feelings, but from the perspective of Jesus Christ. His friend is
my friend. (DCE, §18)

This does not seem to be a rejection of the natural phenomenon of friendship, but the addition of a new sense of friendship that far transcends the
ordinary meaning. Benedict does not begin with ordinary friendship and
extend to this new meaning. He begins with erotic love and articulates
only this highest and universal friendship. It would be interesting to see this
account of friendship developed more fully and related to the ordinary
understanding of friendship, which Benedict mentioned at the beginning.
We are left wondering what place remains for ordinary friendship within
the context of the universal command of love. For the present, it is sufficient to note that the manner in which Benedict uses the word "friendship" in this encyclical often has this theological or universal meaning, but
only our awareness of the natural or philosophical understanding helps us
recognize the distinctiveness of Benedict's sense of friendship, which seems
to be what he means when he refers to the "added depth of meaning"
belonging to this term in John's Gospel (DCE, §3).
Conclusion
The three modes of reason operating in harmony with faith should not
be conceived as rigorously separate from one another. We separate them
mostly in order to be able to clarify the complexity of the harmonious
co- operation between faith and reason, but it is hard to imagine that any
one of them could operate in full independence of the others. The important claim is that our reason is necessarily active when we encounter the
faith for the first time or when we try to deepen our grasp of it and that
faith calls for "the right use of reason" ("Faith," ~l). In the best case,
reason or philosophy makes familiar to us the natural realities in relation
to which the propagation of the faith takes place. In another case, faith
urges the correction of reason in order to eliminate philosophical errors
that stand as competitors against faith. In a third case, the philosophical
use of reason helps to prevent the distinctiveness of faith from sinking
back into a merely natural account of things.
In light of the Regensburg speech, a corrected understanding of reason
itself seems to be what Benedict thinks we need most urgently. Whereas
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dependence on the natural exercise of reason and on ordinary opinion had
been recognized by philosophical reason at least since Socrates, modern
science begins with a rejection of ordinary opinion and of the non-scientific exercise of reason. It is difficult to oversute the 11nportance of this
posture toward ordinary, non-scientific human intelligence. The dominance of science as the authoritative and sole proper use of reason tends to
exclude other forms of reason as illegitimate and extra-scientific quesoons
as unanswerable or meaningless. In this way, science tends to exclude the
possibilicy of philosophy and theology and faith itself. From another direction, some conceptions of God as beyond human reason tend to exclude
the possibilicy of any solid reliance on our reason. Benedict's speech aims
to recover the significance of the ordinary form of reason as the unifying
clement that underlies all developed forms of reason: theology and philosophy as well as science. Benedict·s speech presents an argument that some
forms of faith or theology on the one hand and some forms of modern
scientific r.itionalism on the other can be recognized as deficient by reference to the ordinary form of reason and its philosophical exercise. This is
possible only if we take ordinary human rational icy seriously. Consequently,
the goal of the speech is to reinvigorate this sense of rationalicy in order to
pave the way for the harmonious interaction of reason with faith. Pope
Benedict, then, attempts to defend a broadened understanding of reason
against both Islam and modern scientific rationalism, with a view to
making intelligible the harmony of faith and reason.
N v

